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policy to facilitate trade. In this paper, the development of the AANZFTA is analysed 
within a framework characterising “good” FTAs, and in terms what it may deliver with 
respect to resource-based industries. Past FTAs involving partner countries, changes over 
time, interviews with and submissions from relevant parties are analysed. The analysis 
suggests that the AANZFTA will be a more difficult agreement to develop to fruition 
than have bilateral agreements between the parties. 
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1 This paper draws extensively on Scollay and Trewin (2006) which analysed the ASEAN Australian New 
Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA) in terms of related bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Introduction 
 
There has been a dramatic increase in so-called Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
2 over 
recent years. In terms of World Trade Organisation (WTO) notifications, the number 
have nearly doubled over 2000-2005 from those notified in the previous 50 plus years 
between 1948-2000 (from 91 to 180) (see www.wto.org for more details on notified 
FTAs). Over 25 per cent of the WTO notifications over 2000-2005 were associated with 
Southeast and East Asian countries (Pasadilla 2006). Incorporating the number under 
consideration or negotiation shows that the growth in FTAs is unlikely to abate in the 
future, especially given the uncertainty associated with the WTO Doha Development 
Round.  
 
Often sensitive industries such as those dependent on agricultural resources
3 are left out 
of FTAs, unlike the situation in comprehensive multilateral trade agreements. As 
Australia and New Zealand are classified as developed countries in the WTO, the 
AANZFTA being negotiated between ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) 
and the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 
(ANZCERTA, or CER for short) would have to be notified to the WTO under GATT 
Article XXIV rather than under the Enabling Clause. FTAs involving developed 
countries have to comply with all the requirements of Article XXIV, which includes the 
requirement for coverage of “substantially all trade”. The Enabling Clause is aimed at 
encouraging less developed and developing countries to participate in world trade. FTAs 
under the Enabling Clause are between developing countries (as in the case of the 
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA)), or are non-reciprocal preference programs 
granted by more to less developed countries, and are exempted from some requirements 
including Article XXIV. Article XXIV might be seen as a constraint to successful 
implementation of a FTA between some countries, but Singapore and Japan have signed 
off on a FTA and, although sensitive agriculture has been included, this is in quite 
restrictive terms (maintaining constraints on limited trade in goldfish, tuna and cocoa 
powder from Singapore to Japan, and containing only 14 per cent of the number of zero 
tariff commitments compared to Japan’s WTO commitments). “Substantially all trade” 
has not been clearly determined in the WTO. 
 
On the other hand, FTAs can bring in specific non-WTO aspects to facilitate trade 
including in sensitive sectors, such as through greater flexibility in terms of the timing of 
trade liberalisation. Along these lines, the CER has put anti-dumping claims under 
competition policy. Thus whilst farming groups (e.g. Australian pork) are seeking options 
to improve the accessibility of Australia’s anti-dumping system, and anti-dumping cases 
                                                 
2 FTAs is used as a generic term that includes Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), which involve groups 
rather than individual countries, as well as Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), which might be non-
reciprocal as in the case of the Pacific Regional Trade Agreement (PARTA) with its preferential access for 
Pacific Island Nations to Australian and New Zealand markets. Often these trade agreements overlap as in 
the case of the ASEAN Australian New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA) and bilateral FTAs between Australian 
and/or New Zealand with individual ASEAN countries.  
3 The focus is on agricultural resource-based industries rather than resource-based industries in general as 
minerals and energy trade is relatively free and New Zealand does not have significant minerals and energy 
industries like Australia. in agricultural products are continuing to be brought forward under WTO arrangements, 
these aspects are irrelevant under the CER and the underlying issues dealt with under 
competition policy. This competitive approach lead to the Australian dairy industry 
having by mid-1990, when New Zealand trade in dairy products was to become free and 
fair, to restructure and become competitive which it has to the extent of now exporting 
competitively in a wide-range of dairy products. Also under the CER, standards have 
been harmonised, including through joint food standards, to the extent that goods sold 
legally in either country generally may be sold in the other and this can have associated 
agricultural trade benefits. There have been some areas of dispute with quarantine 
restrictions on the entry of some New Zealand fruit and vegetables such as apples and 
pears into Australia. New Zealand has more open quarantine arrangements than Australia 
because of its geographical location, for example in the case of bananas.  
 
A number of issues are raised in the above discussion: 
- Should sensitive sectors like agriculture be included in FTAs like the 
AANZFTA?  
- Can FTAs advance agricultural trade liberalisation outside of multilateral 
agreements? 
- Are regional agreements like the AANZFTA likely to be more successful in 
including agricultural liberalisation than an associated group of bilaterals?  
In this paper, following some background on AANZFTA-related FTAs, the development 
of the AANZFTA is analysed within a stated framework characterising “good” FTAs 
(e.g. includes “problem” sectors and is comprehensive, maximizing trading 
opportunities), and in terms of what it may deliver for agricultural-based industries with 
respect to the above issues. Past FTAs involving partner countries, changes over time, 
interviews with and submissions from relevant parties are analysed. The analysis suggests 
that the AANZFTA will be a more difficult agreement to develop to fruition than have 
bilateral agreements between the parties, in part due to sensitive sectors like agriculture 
needing to be included in “good” FTAs, though agricultural liberalisation can only be 
fully undertaken at the multilateral level. This contrasts with alternative views that group-
to-group negotiations such as in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) could be 
quicker than a collection of bilateral agreements as there are fewer players involved and 




ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand as a group started FTA negotiations in 2005 that are 
expected to be completed in two years with the AANZFTA fully implemented within ten 
years. These negotiations build on a long history of involvement between the two groups 
of countries dating back to when Australia became the first country to establish formal 
links with ASEAN in 1974. In 1993 it was formally proposed that the scope for 
cooperation between AFTA and CER be examined, which subsequently occurred along 
four tracks, namely Ministerial consultations, trade facilitation, business relationships 
(Australia and New Zealand have many business managers working in ASEAN), and 
“think-tanking”. In 2002 a broad-gauged Closer Economic Partnership (CEP) between 
ASEAN and CER was signed, followed by the FTA negotiations.  
In relation to the individual partners, the CER entered into force on 1 January 1983 and 
has evolved to cover substantially all goods and services. In August 1999, the Prime 
Ministers of both countries outlined their policy on regional agreements in a joint Prime 
Ministerial Statement: “New Zealand and Australia are willing to consider free trade 
agreements with significant individual economies or regional groupings, where they 
would deliver faster and deeper liberalisation than the multilateral process, with the 
objective of gaining better market access for our exporters, faster economic growth and 
stronger employment growth. Such arrangements would need to reflect the principles 
underpinning the CER, including WTO consistency.”  This statement sets out a basis for 
the development of the AANZFTA from a CER perspective. 
 
ASEAN initiated AFTA in 1992 with a focus on regional tariff reductions, initially 
through to 2008 but revised to a shorter period up to 2003. This agreement was 
subsequently broadened to cover non-tariff barriers, harmonisation of standards, etc. 
However, there are a number of sensitive sectors including agricultural ones such as rice 
that have been excluded from the tariff reductions, etc. Associated agreements have now 
also been signed on trade in services and investment. ASEAN as a group has been 
looking to enter into trade agreements with other countries such as China as well as the 
CER. 
 
Australia, New Zealand and individual ASEAN member countries have a number of 
bilateral FTAs between themselves that could have implications for the AANZFTA. For 
example, Lloyd (2005) in an analysis of the Australia-Malaysia FTA (AMFTA) which is 
currently under negotiation suggests in relation to investment negotiations that those for 
AANZFTA should follow relevant bilateral approaches such as on investor protection, 
dispute settlement mechanisms, and national treatment to deepen the agreement, as well 
as attempt to outlaw investment incentives. It is envisaged that AANZFTA will cover in a 
consistent and compatible way, bi-lateral trade between Australia and New Zealand on 
the one hand and each individual ASEAN member on the other, but not the bilateral trade 
between Australia and New Zealand themselves, or the trade among the ASEAN 
members themselves. In respect of Australia, the Singapore-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement (SAFTA) entered into force in July 2003 and the Thailand-Australia Free 
Trade Agreement (TAFTA) was signed in July 2004.  
 
New Zealand has a FTA with Singapore, the New Zealand Singapore CEP (NZSCEP), 
which was completed before the SAFTA. Negotiations on a CEP Agreement between 
New Zealand and Thailand were concluded in November 2004 and entered into force 
from 1 July 2005. In parallel with this CEP, arrangements on labour, environment and 
customs cooperation were negotiated. Arrangements on these first two aspects have not 
been part of Australian negotiations which reflects differences in the socio-economic 
environment and the political economy of the two countries. Negotiations for a Trans-
Pacific Strategic Economic partnership Agreement (TPSEP) involving Brunei 
Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore were recently concluded. The TPSEP 
(together with the parallel agreement on labour and environment) was expected to enter 
into force early in 2006. New Zealand and Malaysia have also started formal rounds of negotiations. Australia and New Zealand have followed each other’s FTAs apart from a 
few exceptions, the most notable being the United States which has a FTA and defence 
agreements with Australia but not New Zealand.  
 
The Guiding Principles for Negotiation on AANZFTA are based on an objective of the 
FTA being mutually beneficial for all parties, and with this objective in mind, the 
negotiations will be guided by the following principles: 
(a) The FTA should be comprehensive in scope, covering trade in goods, services and 
investment. 
(b) The objective of the FTA should be to move towards deeper economic integration 
between the two regions through progressive elimination of all forms of barriers 
to trade in goods, services and investment; and through trade and investment 
facilitation and economic cooperation measures. 
(c) The FTA should, where relevant, build on members’ commitment in the WTO. 
(d) Due consideration should be given to the different levels of development and 
capacity of the Member Countries to participate in comprehensive trade and 
investment liberalization. The FTA should therefore include provisions for 
flexibility, including special and differential treatment, especially for the newer 
ASEAN members. 
(e) Recognising the different levels of development among the Member Countries of 
the two regions, provision should be made for technical assistance and capacity 
building programs to enable all parties to participate fully and to obtain full 
benefit from the FTA. 
(f)  The FTA will be designed to enhance and improve transparency in trade and 
investment relations between the parties. 
(g) The modalities and time frames of the FTA, including differentiated timeframes 
for Australia and New Zealand, ASEAN-6 and CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar and Vietnam), and products, should be settled at an early stage of the 
negotiations. 
(h) The FTA will be open to inclusion of issues not covered by the existing AFTA 
and CER Agreements, to be agreed by all parties. 
(i)  The terms of the FTA will be subject to periodic review. 
(j)  The FTA should be consistent with WTO provisions, including GATT Article 
XXIV and GATS Article V. 
(k) The FTA should draw, as appropriate, on elements of economic integration 
agreements of ASEAN and CER. In addition, the elements of any FTA involving 
ASEAN Member Countries, Australia and New Zealand may be used as reference 
points. 
(l)  AFTA and CER will continue to exist as distinct, functioning agreements, as will 
the FTAs between ASEAN Member Countries, Australia and New Zealand. No 
provision in the FTA will detract from the terms and conditions of bilateral and 
plurilateral FTAs between ASEAN Member Countries, Australia and New 
Zealand.  
 
These Guiding Principles have had different interpretations in the negotiations, including 
in respect of covering “substantially all trade”. Agriculture would be expected to be considered in the AANZFTA as it has in the above related comprehensive FTAs between 
individual ASEAN and CER countries, though often with some flexibility. Agricultural 
products have no special provisions in the CER, SAFTA and the NZSCEP, but make up 
the majority of “sensitive list” products in ASEAN (Scollay 2003). 
 
Agricultural trade liberalisation means in WTO terms, market access, export subsidies, 
and domestic support. In a FTA context, market access is covered but generally not 
export subsidies which is a multilateral issue (though the NZTCEP does prohibit export 
subsidies in agriculture), and generally never domestic support as this would not benefit 
parties inside the FTA any more than those outside the FTA. Satisfactory agricultural 
trade liberalisation through FTAs is dependent on a satisfactory WTO outcome in this 
regard.   
 
A “good” FTA framework 
 
There can be “good” or “bad” FTAs depending on the treatment of aspects such as 
comprehensiveness. There have been a number of research reports that have set out 
similar frameworks of the characteristics of a “good” FTA (e.g. APEC (2006) and PECC 
(2006) – see the appendix for an outline of these frameworks). One such framework that 
has been drawn on by the Australian Departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, was RIRDC (2005) in which a Ten-point checklist 
for better PTAs/FTAs (with the underlying “good” rationale in brackets) was set out: 
1.  Is the price reduction maximized?  
(Trade benefits are maximized when price change is maximized) 
2.  Are ‘problem’ industries included in the PTAs? 
(Increased competitive pressures can lead to additional benefits, especially for 
‘problem’ industries) 
3.  Is the PTA comprehensive, including substantially all trade that would have 
occurred under free trade 
(Comprehensive PTAs create fewer distortions and lower administration and 
compliance costs) 
4.  Are the rules of origin simple, consistent and flexible? 
(Complex and inflexible rules of origin increase the costs of PTAs) 
5. Does the PTA increase certainty for trade and investment? 
(Significant benefits can be gained through increasing the certainty of the trade and 
investment environment) 
6.  Does the PTA also liberate investment rules? 
(PTAs can achieve investment liberalisation to the benefit of both countries) 
7.  Is the PTA free of any ‘new protectionist’ measures, such as unnecessary 
environment, labour market or competition law requirements? 
(Although important, domestic issues should be excluded from PTAs as they can 
prevent trade liberalisation and provide questionable benefit) 
8.  Are the details and consequences of the PTA well understood following a 
transparent process and independent analysis? 
(PTA negotiations should be as transparent and inclusive as possible and detailed 
independent analysis of costs and benefits should be published) 9.  Have PTA partners reinforced their commitment to the WTO and is there a sunset 
clause to multilateralise the PTA? 
(Member countries of PTAs should reinforce their commitment to successful 
multilateral liberalisation) 
10. Does the PTA allow for expansion to include new members and potential 
integration with other PTAs? 
(PTA should extend beyond regional agreements and PTA members should be open 
to expanding membership and merging PTA groupings) 
 
One of the more important points in terms of the focus of this paper is Point 2, related to 
“sensitive” sectors. Pasadilla (2005) argues that special treatment of agriculture can have 
both positive and negative consequences. On the “positive” side, he argues that leaving 
sensitive agriculture out of the negotiations enables a focus on other more mutually 
beneficial sectors. He mentions that Scollay (2003) argued that when the trading partners 
are not competitive in agriculture then its exclusion from the FTA reduces the chance of 
agricultural trade diversion. (Scollay (2003) also argued that with competitive agriculture, 
agricultures inclusion in FTAs leads to trade creation.) However, on the “negative” side 
such an approach could lead to a focus on FTAs at the expense of multilateral approaches 
which are necessary for full agricultural liberalisation.  
 
Moreover, including such sensitive sectors even with extended time for liberalisation 
paves the way for progress on future multilateral negotiations. An added advantage is that 
any liberalisation in FTAs is generally in terms of more liberated applied tariffs rather 
than bound tariffs as in multilateral negotiations.  
 
In looking at the discussion around this issue it should be borne in mind the points made 
in respect of a “good” FTA framework, in particular the above point on including 
“problem” industries to obtain the benefits of increased competitive pressures which 
would include a “first-best” more efficient allocation of resources. Agriculture being a 
small proportion of GDP may lead to the view that it is not important in terms of resource 
allocation but as shown in the case of Japan, agriculture has a disproportionate influence 
on important economic resources such as land that can constrain overall structural 
adjustment and economic performance.      
 
The above key “good” FTA framework points have a strong connection to the earlier 
listed Guiding Principles, for example comprehensiveness, price reductions maximised, 
reinforce WTO commitments, and transparency in trade and investment.  
 
The key “good” FTA framework points also underlie the assumptions in economic 
modelling of the optimal gains from trade and investment liberalisation under the 
AANZFTA (see next section for details on this modelling). For example, the assumptions 
of maximum tariff reductions, and the inclusion of sensitive sectors such as agriculture, 
are included in the modelling. 
 
In addition, the Australian farming sector has stated that multilateral trade liberalisation 
offers the greatest gains for Australian farmers as the WTO is the best avenue for removing all forms of trade distorting policies and for providing more predictable and 
legally enforceable access to markets (AFPRG 2006). However, with the proliferation of 
bilateral and regional trade agreements, they have also stated that Australia should 
negotiate such agreements where they provide substantial gains in market access that 
cannot be achieved otherwise in a similar time frame. The agreements should also be 
WTO-consistent and contribute to the overall goal of trade liberalisation. Agreements that 
are not comprehensive, such as excluding agriculture, are seen as not being in Australia’s 
interests. The Australian farming sector has also stated that food safety is non-negotiable 
but that appropriate measures dealing with product safety and integrity must be applied 
transparently, be least trade distorting, and not discriminate between domestically 
produced and imported goods. Again key “good” FTA framework points arise in the 
farming sectors position such as WTO-consistency, inclusion of all sectors, and 
comprehensiveness in the sense of covering all forms of trade distortions. 
 
Analysis of the development of the AANZFTA 
 
The development of the AANZFTA is analysed within the “good” FTA framework just 
outlined, specifically in terms of what it may deliver in respect of agricultural-based 
industries – mainly in terms of the factors mentioned above such as sensitive sectors, 
comprehensiveness, rules of origin, and so on
4. The analysis will draw on past FTAs, 
changes over time, and discussions with and submissions from various government 
officials, business representatives etc.   
 
Sensitive sectors 
(This subsection covers Point 1 on Maximising price reductions and Point 2 on Including 
“problem” industries.) Agriculture has been shown to be a sensitive sector in both 
TAFTA and NZTCEP with tariffs to be phased out, including over the longest period of 
20 years. During this transitional period there are provisions to use Tariff Rate Quotas 
(TRQs) and special safeguard measures for certain sensitive products (this includes 
agricultural goods but the number of allowed sensitive sectors are limited). For goods 
subject to the special safeguard measures, duties may be increased up to the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) level on imports in excess of specified quantities set out in the 
agreement. The products covered by the special safeguards are meat, dairy and 
horticulture products, with transitional periods of 10 to 15 years. The volume of imports 
required to trigger the special safeguards rises year-by-year through the transitional 
period. The TRQ provisions apply to dairy and some horticultural products, and in the 
case of TAFTA, also to coffee, tea and cane sugar. The TRQs specify gradually 
increasing volumes to be subject to the preferential tariffs as they are phased down during 
the transitional period. Import volumes in excess of the TRQ levels are subject to an out-
of-quota tariff 10 per cent below the MFN rate. Imports become duty-free and quota-free 
at the end of the transitional period. The transitional period is 15 years for most TRQ 
products but some 20 years for dairy products. The products subject to TRQs in TAFTA 
                                                 
4 The ten-point checklist for “good” FTAs made up of these factors will basically be followed apart from 
those just covering investment (Point 6) or other points that are not strongly related to agriculture, or are 
not covered in the AANZFTA Guiding Principles such as Point 5 on Increased certainty (separate of 
aspects in Point 8 on Transparency etc) and Point 10 on New members.  and NZTCEP are among products for which Thailand has also scheduled TRQs in its 
commitments under the WTO Agreement in Agriculture. The TAFTA and NZTCEP 
specify that the TRQs in those agreements are separate from, and do not in any way 
modify, Thailand’s TRQs under the Agreement on Agriculture. 
  
Some analysis of sensitive sectors was undertaken in Scollay and Trewin (2006). The 
first component of this analysed the frequency distribution of tariff levels for sensitive 
sectors of the eight ASEAN countries that applied tariffs (Singapore does not) or who 
were not in the process of WTO accession and tariff determination like Vietnam was at 
the time of the analysis. This analysis was repeated just for agricultural products to 
determine if there were any different points arising. Some of the key points that arose 
were: 
-  a couple of the more developed countries in Brunei and Malaysia had no sensitive 
agricultural sectors; 
-  opposite to the outcome across all sectors of the more developed ASEAN 
countries applying the highest level of tariffs, in agriculture this tended to be less 
developed countries like Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar (as well as the 
Philippines in respect of some meats), though at a lower tariff level;  
-  as with the outcome across all sectors, Cambodia with its recent accession to the 
WTO had one of the narrowest range of associated tariffs across agriculture (0-
20%) in conjunction with Indonesia who in agriculture had the range of 0-10% 
compared to an overall range of 0-30% (though this has risen in respect of rice in 
recent times – see Warr (2005)); 
-  in terms of the largest number of sensitive agricultural sectors, the less developed 
countries of Laos and Myanmar had the largest number (75 and 128 respectively) 
and the largest proportion relative to all sensitive sectors (75/88 and 128/270 
respectively – the Philippines was next at 20/264); 
-  as with the outcome across all sectors, Cambodia had the largest number of 
sensitive agricultural sectors with associated applied zero tariffs (6) followed by 
Indonesia (4), and Laos and Myanmar (2 each) (the implications of zero tariffs for 
so-called sensitive sectors are discussed later in this section). 
 
Another component of the analysis looked at the frequency distribution of the number of 
ASEAN countries with the same sensitive sectors. There were no sensitive sectors that 
applied to more than 5 of the countries (the largest cases were plastics, footwear, motor 
vehicles and colour TVs). In the case of agriculture this was for only 3 of the countries, 
with capsicums. There was also a much lower proportion of 2 countries with the same 
sensitive agricultural sectors (6% in agriculture compared to 20% across all sectors).  
 
 In some of the above same sensitive sector cases, the tariffs were large in some countries 
(20-60%) but low in other countries (0-4%). Over 100 sensitive sectors had zero applied 
tariffs and 7 of these were agricultural sectors, about half the overall rate. These last 
aspects raise the question of what is meant by sensitive if the sector is not associated with 
high applied tariffs, and the implications for FTAs given sensitive sectors often have 
different treatment in terms of the degree of tariff cuts or the period for implementing 
such cuts (if tariffs are already low such treatment has little meaning apart from locking in low applied rates by lowering bound rates). In addition to longer phase-out periods and 
other measures mentioned earlier, sensitive sectors could obtain non-tariff forms of 
protection, such as through anti-dumping actions, but would not need to be deemed 
sensitive for such action to be applicable. It may be that sensitive reflects a situation 
where the sector is deemed to be possibly requiring flexibility to raise tariffs or 
implement Emergency Safeguard Measures. This last aspect may be better in that 
applying consistently high tariffs on sectors where countries have a comparative 
advantage could impede the development of downstream industries with high value 
adding (e.g. as in the case of India and Sri Lanka with tea – lucrative blending being 
undertaken in a neighbouring country with more open trade policies). The majority of the 
high tariff sectors were associated with low Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA, 
often measured by a product’s share in a country’s exports in relation to its share in world 
trade) and low exports (the correlation was a significant -0.16) but around a dozen data 
points had positive RCAs. Colour TVs in ASEAN was an example of a components 
sector with strong comparative advantage also having some high tariffs. Other sectors 
with high tariffs and a strong RCA included agricultural products in beans and ginger. In 
the Australian case the correlation between Australian tariffs and exports was -0.018. 
There were a small number of sectors with high tariffs and low exports but their 
contribution to the correlation estimate was swamped by a large number of sectors with 
low tariffs and high or low RCAs (reflecting the view that it is not worth protecting 
sectors where you have no comparative advantage, and that there was no need protecting 
sectors where you have a comparative advantage).   
 
A few other points that can be drawn from this analysis were: 
-  the large proportion of sensitive sectors applying in only a single country may 
appear somewhat surprising given the view that there are strong similarities 
between the ASEAN countries in some aspects (e.g. the evidence that ASEAN 
countries have been forming networks of components in some industries like 
electrical products but even in this case the networks appear to be taking 
advantage of differences between ASEAN countries such as in their stages of 
development which also influences agriculture’s comparative advantage);  
-  This last point would suggest a key approach to improving ASEAN’s trade and 
investment situation would be to free up these aspects, at least internally in the 
first instance (If ASEAN took a “Union of overlapping sets” approach in 
negotiations and made any sector sensitive that an ASEAN country deemed as 
sensitive then it would appear less attractive as a negotiating partner than 
individual ASEAN countries). 
 
Some further analysis of the ASEAN sensitive sectors was undertaken in relation to 
Australian exports and imports. In the majority of cases (737 out of 1415), Australian 
exports were less than imports, suggesting that Australia would not be a threat to these 
sensitive sectors though the reverse applied in respect of agricultural sectors with exports 
being greater than imports in the majority of sectors (207 out of 257). In a further 379 
cases there were no associated Australian exports or imports with roughly the same 
proportion applying in the agricultural sectors. In only 299 of the 1415 cases, or around 
20 percent of the ASEAN sensitive sectors, did it appear Australia had a possible comparative advantage and this would be relatively higher across agricultural sectors. 
Thus in agriculture, Australia and New Zealand would be more of a threat to the sensitive 
sectors which are mainly associated with developing countries. Not that trade competition 
for domestic producers is necessarily undesirable as it promotes efficiency which has 




(This subsection covers Point 3 on Comprehensiveness.) Typically agreements such as 
those above also contain chapters on technical barriers to trade (TBT), and sanitary and 
phyto-sanitary measures (SPS). In relation to TBTs, ASEAN have agreed to a mechanism 
to effectively address private sector complaints in this area. With respect to SPS, in the 
area of aquaculture development, ASEAN are working towards harmonisation of testing 
and quarantine procedures, and more generally in respect of regulations. Under the CER, 
measures are not allowed to be disguised barriers to trade and must have a scientific 
basis. There are commitments to harmonise standards and procedures such as quality 
accreditation systems, and have regular dialogues between senior officials. Bilateral 
agreements between ASEAN and CER countries tend to follow the WTO. The bilateral 
agreements between CER countries and Thailand have elements that go beyond WTO 
provisions such as working towards harmonisation without changing protection levels; 
considering accepting control, inspection and approval procedures of partner, following 
internationally recognised procedures – review own procedures on request with respect to 
being reasonable and necessary; consultative/cooperative approach to non-complying 
shipments; avoid suspending trade based on one shipment; and establish expert group or 
SPS/Joint SPS Committee. 
 
Interviews with parties involved in relevant FTAs, and submissions to the development 
of specific FTAs by interested parties, also related to the comprehensiveness issue. 
Australian Plantation Products and the Paper Industry Council (APPPIC) stated in a 
submission that the AMFTA could offer benefits for some of their industry interests but 
also risks to its manufacturing interest, and pointed to the need for some balance. Dairy 
Australia who supply for local Malaysian consumption as well as processing for export, 
agreed that meaningful gains in market access were needed and added that tariffs and 
licensing arrangements mainly benefited multi-national processors, not local industries. 
Some of the industry groups that felt more threatened by FTAs, such as APPPIC etc, 
pushed for strong positions on anti-dumping and standards. Quarantine was raised by a 
number of food industry groups and some governments, such as the Australian Chicken 
Meat Federation and the Northern Territory and Western Australian governments, but in 
these cases from the perspective of not liberalising trade given the risk to the health of 
Australian industries. Standards were also raised by a range of industries including the 
Winemakers Federation of Australia.  
 
Officials from the New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development are firmly of the 
view that standards and other TBT issues must be addressed in FTAs, in parallel to tariff 
issues, if market access is to become truly effective. There is a significant difference 
between the attitude of larger companies like Fonterra who are interested in the effects of FTAs on their international supply chain management, and smaller exporters who tend to 
be most concerned with direct market access for their finished products. New Zealand 
places a very high priority on bio-security controls at the border because of the serious 
consequences of a major pest incursion or disease outbreak for New Zealand’s vital 
agriculture and forestry industries. Poultry products and pork are the main industries that 
do in practice derive significant protection form bio-security measures in New Zealand. 
As in Australia, industry opposition can be expected to proposals to relax quarantine 
controls for these products.  
 
Rules of Origin 
(This subsection covers Point 4 on Simple, consistent and flexible Rules of Origin.) Rules 
of Origin (ROOs) have moved over time from being based on the share of the country of 
origin in the production of a good to those based on a Change in Tariff Classification 
(CTC) (DFAT 2007). The ROOs in existing FTAs of the ASEAN and CER countries 
exhibit a significant evolution of thinking in both groups on the way that ROOs should be 
designed, which will undoubtedly influence the positions they are likely to take on this 
issue in the AANZFTA negotiations.  
 
Both AFTA and CER utilize a regional value content (RVC) rule for ROOs. In the CER 
the requirement is 50% RVC, whereas in AFTA the requirement is 40% RVC, with full 
cumulation allowed among the AFTA members which is important for the production 
networks that have been a feature of ASEAN. The NZSCEP and SAFTA also follow the 
RVC approach. The later TAFTA and NZTCEP mark a decisive change in the approach 
taken to ROOs by the three countries concerned. The basic approach used in these 
agreements is the CTC. All products in the HS Tariff Classification are listed in the 
agreements either at the 6-digit or aggregated to the 4-digit level, and the applicable rule 
is specified in every case. For the vast majority of items the basic rule is a CTC rule, 
either a change in customs heading or CTH (change at the 4-digit level) or change in 
customs sub-heading or CTSH (change at the 6-digit level). Very occasionally a 
particular heading or sub-heading is excluded from the changes that are deemed to confer 
origin. For a small number of products a specific process or processes must be performed 
in order to confer origin. For example in the case of processed frozen fish, three or more 
processes listed in the agreement must have been performed in the territory of a party. 
For a small number of products there is a requirement that they must be “wholly 
obtained” in the territory of a party, as in the case of tobacco products, or produced from 
natural plants found in the territory of a party, as in the case of natural rubber products. 
This requirement could result in the loss of some value adding opportunities as was 
mentioned earlier in relation to tea blending. In both TAFTA and NZTCEP additional 
restrictiveness is introduced for some products by combining a CTH or CTSH rule with 
an RVC rule that must be satisfied as well as the applicable CTC rule. ASEAN has also 
begun to introduce CTC and specific process rules into AFTA as alternatives to the 40% 
RVC rule, meaning that for the products concerned exporters have a choice as to which 
ROO to use. Specific process rules have been introduced for wheat, wheat flour and 
wood products. The rules of the ASEAN China FTA (ACFTA) closely follow the AFTA 
rules; that is the basic requirement is a 40% RVC rule, but specific process rules that 
closely follow the corresponding AFTA rules have been introduced. CTC rules have also been introduced for a limited range of products, including for salmon and herrings 
(CTSH rule). There are also rules for some types of wool that require the wool to have 
been produced from ‘sheep, lambs or other animals raised in the ACFTA’.  
 
A number of the above approaches are not consistent or simple, making trade more 
difficult, whereas on the other hand some show flexibility in terms of offering a choice of 
approach that will maximise trade. This illustrates that it is difficult to generalise about 
ROOs and that each case has to be assessed of its merits.  
 
Non-trade issues 
(This subsection covers Point 7 on “New protectionist” issues.) The CER belongs to an 
older generation of agreements and in some senses is very advanced. A particularly 
advanced feature is the use of harmonised competition law provisions to take the place of 
anti-dumping actions on trade between the two countries. This has facilitated trade 
between the two countries. 
 
The NZTCEP and TPSEP include understandings on labour and environment issues, and 
as mentioned earlier these are not issues that Australia has include in its FTAs and are 
issues that have been sensitive to developing countries in WTO negotiations. These 
aspects, along with quarantine differences, could lead to complications in the negotiation 
of the AANZFTA.  
 
Some of these non-trade or domestic issues can be constraints to or facilitators of trade 
but are probably best handled separately of trade negotiations and on their own merits 
(RIRDC 2005). 
 
Transparency and independent analysis 
(This subsection covers Point 8 on Better understanding through transparency and 
independent analysis.) Transparency involves peer review before FTAs are finally 
concluded, and texts of FTAs being publicly available as soon as possible after 
agreements have been concluded. These have been an element of the Thai-related FTAs 
involving Australia and New Zealand.  
 
In respect of the AANZFTA, modelling undertaken as part of a review process has shown 
that a good agreement could lead to substantial economic gains to all partners, including 
from agricultural liberalisation which is incorporated in the modelling. The CIE (2000) 
estimated the gains from a FTA between ASEAN and the CER (with zero tariffs on 
goods and services by 2005) to be around US$48 billion (in net present value terms over 
the period 2000 to 2020) with the majority of the gains going to ASEAN (US$26 billion) 
and of the CER countries, the smaller New Zealand gaining the least (US$3.4 billion). 
Earlier estimates that did not take into account service trade liberalisation and 
productivity gains from trade liberalisation were much lower at US$16 billion. 
Agriculture has been one of the big beneficiaries of productivity gains resulting from 
research and development. The AFTA sensitive list is taken as predominantly 
unprocessed agricultural products that are granted more flexible liberalisation 
arrangements. The largest proportional increases in estimated production from the modelling are in agriculture and manufacturing, including non-durable manufacturing 
which comprises of processed foods such as dairy products, sugar and beef for the CER 
countries.  
 
Commitment to the WTO 
(This subsection covers Point 9 on a Commitment to the WTO and a sunset clause to 
multilateralise the FTA.) There is no sunset clause in the AANZFTA to multilateralise it 
but there is a clause that ensures there are periodic reviews of the FTA that could 
recommend such action. There are also specific clauses to build on members’ 
commitments in the WTO, and to be consistent with the WTO, including GATT Article 
XXIV and GATS Article V.    
 
Overview 
The analysis shows that there are a number of differences both between the negotiating 
partner groups, and within the groups themselves, that make the negotiations more 
difficult than between individual countries. One of these differences was in relation to 
sensitive sectors in which agricultural sectors were prevalent in some of the less 
developed ASEAN countries as well as more country specific and with more non-zero 
applied tariffs than for non-agriculture. Such sensitive sectors have been dealt with in 
some of the bilateral FTAs such as those involving CER countries and Thailand through 
longer liberalisation periods, etc, but some ASEAN countries seem to view some 
agricultural sectors such as rice as being sensitive indefinitely. Australia and New 
Zealand would offer a greater threat in agriculture to ASEAN, especially for developing 
country members, than in many other sectors and also many other prospective partners. 
Selective bilateral FTAs would seem to be more attractive under these circumstances and 
a number of these seem to have been initiated to avoid such difficulties. Consolidation of 
liberalisation commitments within ASEAN would make an FTA such as AANZFTA 
more attractive to partner countries as well as facilitating intra-ASEAN trade with its 
associated benefits to ASEAN countries and countries that trade with them. There would 
be advantages in an FTA with ASEAN rather than individual member countries in terms 
of linking directly into production networks and easier access to the ASEAN market as a 
whole for exporters and investors in the partner countries. 
 
Another difference identified in the analysis was in respect of comprehensiveness with 
the negotiations covering all sectors such as services, investment, etc, all barriers 
including non-tariff barriers (NTBs), quarantine etc. Many of these aspects, as well as 
intellectual property, government procurement, and competition policy, are more difficult 
to organise internally within a diverse group of countries like ASEAN than they are 
externally in bilaterals between more comparable countries, for example between CER 
countries and Singapore. The same situation can apply in the other direction with some 
CER agricultural sectors being sensitive in terms of quarantine arrangements that would 
not be an issue with countries like Singapore with a small agricultural sector but might be 
with other ASEAN countries like the Philippines. 
 
There have been differences over time observed in past FTAs involving CER and 
ASEAN countries, the most notable being in respect of ROOs. ROOs have started to evolve from a share of the country of origin in the production (RVC) of a good to those 
based on a Change in Tariff Classification (CTC), or on occasions a combination of the 
two, or even based on having undergone a particular process. ROOs are not as critical for 
agricultural products per se as they are for more processed products but there can be 
situations like with the earlier mentioned tea blending case and a lot of agricultural 
products are inputs into processed foods which form part of the ASEAN production 
networks. An example of difficulties that can be caused by ROOs of the type described 
above is for flour, bakers’ wares from Australia to the United States which contains the 
condition “provided that the products containing over 10% by weight of milk solids do 
not contain non-originating dairy products” and raises difficulties with New Zealand 
content in exports. A bit like the “spaghetti bowl” effect
5, a mix of ROOs within ASEAN 
countries would add to the complexity of negotiating AANZFTA over bilateral 
agreements between CER and ASEAN countries. Consistent ROOs would contribute to 
minimising the “spaghetti bowl” effect but if this consistent set was based on a “Union of 
overlapping sets” approach then there would be costs in terms of lost trading 
opportunities. 
 
Within the CER countries there are some differences such as on the inclusion of chapters 
on labour and the environment in some New Zealand but not Australian agreements, as 
well as in relation to agriculture, such as in respect of quarantine on products like bananas 
that are not grown in New Zealand but are in Australia, that could cause greater 
difficulties for AANZFTA over bilateral agreements between specific CER and ASEAN 
countries.  
 
Modelling of the AANZFTA has shown that there are big gains from liberalisation, 
including through agricultural productivity, but that these gains are relatively different for 
the various parties. There was no modelling of some of the less measurable benefits that 
would flow from the FTA such as better quarantine arrangements so it is not surprising 
that there do not appear to be any estimates of the benefits of operating with ASEAN as a 
group (e.g. better access to production networks) over a group of bilateral FTAs. 
Bilaterals with the more developed ASEAN countries would deliver most of the 
measured gains to CER countries. WTO liberalisation would be necessary to obtain the 
full benefits from agricultural liberalisation such as from the removal of export subsidies. 
Modelling has also shown that the AANZFTA is less important in economic terms to all 
countries involved in the AANZFTA than China-related FTAs. This last aspect is 
reflected in business interest in the various agreements. Where the gains from 
liberalisation are greater and more direct there will be greater interest, suggesting the 
AANZFTA may lag behind bilateral FTAs and those involving other partners. This 
would be one explanation of less progress on the AFTA CER CEP than expected that was 
mentioned in Access Economics (2001) which looked at the benefits and costs of a FTA 
between Australia and Singapore.   
 
Much of the above discussion has been premised on the need to include “problem” 
sectors such as agriculture, a stated component of a “good” FTA. Others such as Pasadilla 
(2005) have stated there are positives and negatives from the inclusion of “problem” 
                                                 
5 The proliferation of overlapping FTAs that may lead to complications for traders and administrators. sectors such as agriculture in some FTAs. Mention is made of a suggestion in Scollay 
(2003) that exclusion of agriculture may be a positive when trading partners are not 
competitive in agriculture as this would avoid trade diversion effects, and the diversion of 
effort from more mutually beneficial sectors. However, this is a “second-best” outcome 
which dismisses the effects of competition on the performance of such sectors and 
efficient allocation of resources, which can be significant in the case of agriculture even 
when its contribution to GDP is small because of its influence over important resources 
such as land that can affect overall economic performance. 
 
In terms of the drivers of the negotiation of FTAs, these are more than those listed for a 
“good” FTA which tend to focus on direct economic effects. If the history of FTAs is 
analysed then it can be appreciated there have been various drivers at work. Many have 
been developed between major traders which would favour bilaterals between CER and 
selective ASEAN countries over AANZFTA. This aspect would be different if ASEAN 
liberalised its internal trade and brought forward the advantages of a regional grouping 
without the disadvantages of differences in trade aspects. There have also been strategic 
drivers of FTAs and this is often put forward as a justification of the cost of the Common 
Agricultural Plan (CAP) in the European Union (EU). This could be a factor favouring 
AANZFTA over bilaterals and there has been a long history of CER countries engaging 
with ASEAN purely on diplomatic grounds. On the other hand, the strength of agriculture 
in many countries’ political economy might go against any trade agreement involving 
agriculture being implemented. There have also been development drivers associated 
with the implementation of some FTAs as with the preferential trade access Australia and 
New Zealand offer to less developed countries, in particular the Pacific Island Nations. A 
similar rationale might apply to the CLVM aspects of the AANZFTA but as pointed out 
in Scollay and Trewin (2006), the AANZFTA will diminish relative tariff differentials 
between CLVM and other ASEAN countries. Whether these preferences are best 
approached bilaterally, in a separate agreement, or as an aspect of the AANZFTA, is 
debatable, especially given the differential level of development of some countries within 
such groupings, Vietnam in the case of CLVM. Generally FTAs are motivated by a 
combination of the above drivers. 
 
In summary, the analysis would suggest that the AANZFTA will be a more difficult 
agreement to develop to fruition than have some bilateral agreements between the parties, 
due in part to sensitive sectors such as agriculture which are best included but require 




Scollay and Trewin (2006), on which this paper is drawn, highlighted a number of key 
issues in the general development of the AANZFTA, a number of which are relevant to 
the agricultural focus taken in this paper. These are listed here along with some specific 
agricultural-related responses: 
•  The existing agreements exhibit a preference for comprehensiveness in both 
product and issue coverage  
(Thus it should be expected that agriculture will be included in the AANZFTA); •  Comprehensive product coverage in the existing agreements is facilitated by 
the use of extended time periods, TRQs and special safeguards  
(This has been shown in the case of Thailand but may be more difficult with some 
other ASEAN countries that have seen some agricultural sectors as sensitive 
indefinitely); 
•  Flexibility can be provided to cater for the sensitivities of individual members 
while maintaining overall WTO-consistence of the agreement  
(The first part of the response to the preceding point applies); 
•  Preferences will diminish over time as the level of tariffs continues to decline 
with liberalisation, unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally. Ultimately the 
preferential impact is likely to be largely in the nature of “levelling the 
playing field” in the Australian and New Zealand markets, both among 
ASEAN members and between ASEAN and other existing and future partners 
of those two groups. One implication is that other provisions in the FTA will 
grow in importance, supporting a comprehensive approach at the outset 
(Agriculture will need to give consideration to quarantine and other such aspects); 
•  The existing agreements suggest the generosity of concessions offered by 
Australia and New Zealand may be related to the degree of openness in 
partner’s markets  
(Few of the ASEAN countries have open agricultural markets but the approach in 
the AANZFTA to agriculture can probably be gained from that which has 
developed within the CER); 
•  In the existing agreements, Australia and New Zealand have offered the 
longest implementation periods, with corresponding lessening of the value of 
preferences, for their most sensitive products, notably textiles and clothing, 
which are also subject to the most restrictive rules of origin  
(Quarantine and related issues may be treated similarly with respect to 
agriculture); 
•  Consolidation of liberalisation commitments with ASEAN would facilitate the 
development of a coherent ASEAN approach to sensitive products and make 
AANZFTA more attractive, as well as facilitate intra-ASEAN trade with its 
associated benefits  
(This is particularly relevant to agriculture which contains a large proportion of 
the sensitive sectors); 
•  Provisions on government procurement, intellectual property (IP) and 
competition policy are included in the existing agreements, but inclusion of 
these issues does not necessarily imply a need to undertake substantial 
obligations. An important issue is whether such provisions should be subject 
to dispute settlement. This is not generally the case in the existing agreements (Agriculture is not a key focus here, especially in respect of government 
procurement, but the issues have some relevance, in particular IP in the case of 
agricultural productivity); 
•  Consistency of rules of origin across ASEAN FTAs could be an important 
contribution to untangling the “spaghetti bowl” effect with its high costs  
(ROOs are not as big an issue with agriculture directly, more via their impact on 
processed products, but when these are applied so as to constrain trade, 
agriculture can be as adversely affected as other sectors); and 
•  It would be desirable for ASEAN to seek a definite assessment of the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of RVC versus CTC in facilitating trade and 
converge to the most appropriate approach  
(As just mentioned, this can be just as desirable for agriculture as for other 
sectors, especially for processed food production networks). 
 
At the outset of the paper a number of issues were raised in respect of agriculture and 
FTAs. These issues were:  
-  Should sensitive sectors like agriculture be included in FTAs like the AANZFTA?  
-  Can FTAs advance agricultural trade liberalisation outside of multilateral 
agreements?  
-  Are regional agreements like the AANZFTA likely to be more successful in 
including agricultural liberalisation than an associated group of bilaterals? 
The overarching issue considered in this paper is the interaction between agriculture and 
FTAs, in particular in relation to regional agreements between groups of countries versus 
bilateral agreements versus multilateral agreements. An evolving history of FTAs is 
considered in the analysis, along with discussions and written submissions on the issue 
from government officials, businesses etc. The “good” FTA framework that is set out 
shows how the exclusion of “problem sectors” like agriculture from FTAs would only be 
at best a “second-best” outcome due to constraining competition and resource allocation.  
 
Though from an agricultural perspective, the best approach to trade liberalisation would 
be a multilateral one, there has been a rapid rise in FTAs in recent years since the 
multilateral round stalled. A number of “good” FTA frameworks have been developed 
with a common feature that they mimic the best aspects of a multilateral agreements such 
as comprehensiveness. Still modelling shows that although gains from agricultural 
liberalisation are substantial in both cases, the gains from multilateral reform are much 
larger. A multilateral agreement is required to achieve the full benefits of agricultural 
liberalisation such as through the removal of domestic support and export subsidies. 
“Good” FTAs need to be building blocks for multilateral agreements through some of the 
points mentioned earlier like simple etc ROOs and even addressing aspects like export 
subsidies as in the case of the NZTCEP. Any progress on agricultural liberalisation in a 
FTA would be an advance on current multilateral negotiations.  
 
There is no modelling of the benefits of ASEAN as a group relative to a group of 
ASEAN bilateral FTAs but the modelling of the major bilateral FTAs between the 
Australia and ASEAN countries shows that the majority of the benefits to Australia are 
captured by these bilaterals. Analysis shows that if ASEAN can get its internal act together than it would bring forward additional benefits such as easier access to regional 
networks of production over bilateral agreements. The analysis suggests that the 
AANZFTA will need to include agriculture like the WTO negotiations and likewise will 
be a more difficult agreement to develop to fruition than have bilateral agreements 
between the parties. This contrasts to a position put on the FTAA (which has stalled in 
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Appendix: GUIDELINES ON “HIGH-QUALITY” FTAs 
 
PECC Trade Forum Proposal for an APEC Common Understanding on RTAs 
 
Relation to the “Pathfinder” Concept 
While preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) may not meet the formal criteria for 
“Pathfinder” initiatives, the array of PTAs in which APEC economies have engaged may 
usefully be viewed in the spirit of the “Pathfinder” concept. This implies that they should 
be fully consistent with APEC objectives and principles. It also implies that participation in 
the network of PTAs being developed within the APEC region should, over time, become 
open to all APEC economies. 
 
Conformity with APEC Liberalization Objectives 
Commitment to the Bogor Goals 
It is important that APEC members engaging in PTAs re-affirm that they remain 
committed to the Bogor goals and that pursuit of PTAs does not detract from that 
commitment. It should be acknowledged that this means that the liberalisation and 
facilitation provisions of PTAs between APEC members must be extended to all APEC 
economies by the Bogor target dates. 
 
Timetable 
The timetable for liberalisation within PTAs between APEC members should be 
consistent with the Bogor dates i.e. it should not extend beyond 2010 in PTAs involving 
developed APEC economies and beyond 2020 in other PTAs. 
 
MFN Liberalisation  
It is important that MFN liberalization should proceed in parallel with PTAs being 
implemented by APEC members. This will assist in minimising negative effects of PTAs 
and will provide assurance that the Bogor goals will ultimately be reached. In order to 
minimise negative effects of PTAs it is important that all MFN barriers be reduced to 
moderate levels as soon as possible, thereby limiting margins of preference in PTAs and 
so reducing the scope for trade diversion. Elimination of peak tariffs and tariff escalation 
must be a priority. 
 
Conformity with APEC Principles in the Osaka Action Agenda 
Non-Discrimination 
In line with the APEC principle of non-discrimination, credible assurances should be given 
that the concessions provided within the PTAs between APEC members will be made 
available to all APEC members as soon as circumstances allow, and no later than the 
Bogor target dates, by one of the three following means:   a credible up-front commitment on the part of APEC members to eventually 
multilateralise the concessions that they make to PTA partners. 
  inclusion in each PTA of an “open accession” clause, providing for the automatic 
acceptance of a membership application from any economy willing to join the PTA 
on the same terms and conditions.   
  a credible form of commitment to inclusiveness, whereby each member 
demonstrates preparedness to entertain the possibility of a PTA relationship with 
every other member, whether through negotiation of a bilateral PTA or through 
membership of a larger PTA grouping, and that no APEC member will be 




In line with the APEC principle of WTO-consistency, PTAs between APEC members 
should be fully consistent with GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V. It must be 
recognised that this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for ensuring that these 
PTAs contribute to the achievement of APEC objectives. 
 
Comprehensiveness and Flexibility 
In line with the APEC principles of comprehensiveness and flexibility, PTAs among APEC 
members should cover trade in both goods and services, and should also cover all 
sectors, with sensitive sectors being liberalised on a slower timetable with due regard to 
the sensitivities of member economies. 
 
Transparency 
In line with the APEC principle of transparency, APEC members should institute their own 
process of peer review of PTAs involving APEC members. To be fully effective, peer 
review should occur before the PTAs are finally concluded. It is also important that 
provision be made for the inclusion of PTAs in the IAPs of APEC members.  Also in the 
interests of transparency, the texts of PTAs should be made publicly available as soon as 
possible after agreements are concluded.   
 
Co-operation 
In line with the APEC principle of cooperation, peer reviews of PTAs involving APEC 
members should provide an opportunity for discussion of any problems that the PTAs 
being reviewed may be causing for other APEC members, and of ways of resolving those 
problems. 
 
Consistency with other APEC Principles 
Where relevant, provisions in PTAs among APEC members should be linked to the 
specific sets of Principles that APEC members have adopted such as the Principles on 
Competition and Regulatory Reform, the Non-Binding Investment Principles, the 
Principles on Government Procurement, and the Principles on Trade Facilitation.  
Promoting Convergence and Minimising “Spaghetti Bowl” Problems 
Rules of Origin 
Rules of origin are not an appropriate mechanism for protecting “sensitive sectors” or 
for facilitating adjustment to liberalisation. Complex rules with protectionist purposes 
should be avoided. Ideally rules of origin should as far as possible be neutral in their 
impacts on trade flows. Rules of origin should be as straightforward as possible, and 
should be transparent, clear and consistent, and should not impose unnecessary 
compliance costs. It is important to allow full cumulation in PTAs with multiple members.  
The development by APEC members of “best practice guidelines” for preferential rules of 
origin would be a very useful contribution. 
 
Facilitation Measures 
Adoption of harmonised provisions across PTAs in the APEC region should be 
encouraged, especially for provisions on trade and investment facilitation. Use should be 
made wherever possible of international standards and APEC-wide agreements and 
processes, including mutual recognition agreements.   
 
Exploration should be undertaken of the potential for harmonisation of facilitation 
provisions across PTAs to contribute to APEC objectives by opening the way for APEC-
wide application of the provisions in question and by assisting eventual convergence of 
PTAs. 
  
Consideration should be given to the development of “best practice” guidelines for 
each type of provision typically found in PTAs. 
 
“Best Practice” Guidelines for PTA Liberalisation 
APEC members should endeavour to ensure that the liberalisation of both goods and 
services within PTAs is progressive and automatic. 
 
In the case of services trade, binding of the status quo should be regarded as 
acceptable.  Where liberalisation is undertaken, MFN liberalisation should be regarded as 
the norm, especially in key infrastructure sectors. APEC members should not insist on 
preferential liberalisation by their PTA partners in these key sectors. To facilitate 
liberalisation of trade in services, relevant domestic regulations should be subject to a 
necessity test, and should be applied in the least trade restrictive manner possible. 
 
In cases where liberalisation cannot commence immediately “negative lists” should be 
employed, with provision for regular reviews aimed at removing all remaining trade 
restrictions. This should apply to both goods and services trade, including “sensitive 
sectors”. The “negative lists” should be subject to “sunset clauses” and there should be 
no permanent exclusions.  
Development Dimension 
PTAs and Closer Economic Partnerships (CEPs) between APEC economies should allow 
for assistance in capacity building to be provided to developing economy members by 
their developed economy partners.  The potential for CEPs to serve as vehicles for the 
provision of regional public goods should be recognised and exploited. PECC Best Practice for RTAs/FTAs/ in APEC 
RTAs/FTAs involving APEC economies can best support the achievement of the APEC 
Bogor Goals by having the following characteristics: 
 
Consistency with APEC Principles and Goals 
•  They address the relevant areas in Part 1 (Liberalisation and Facilitation) of the 
Osaka Action Agenda (OAA) and they are consistent with its General Principles. 
In this way they help to ensure that APEC accomplishes the free trade and 
investment goals set out in the 1994 Bogor Leaders Declaration. 
•  They build upon work being undertaken by APEC. 
•  Consistent with APEC goals, they promote structural reform among the parties 
through the implementation of transparent, open and non-discriminatory 
regulatory frameworks and decision-making processes. 
 
Consistency with the WTO 
•  They are fully consistent with the disciplines of the WTO, especially those 
contained in Article XXIV of the GATT and Article V of the GATS. 
•  When they involve developing economies to whom the Enabling Clause applies, 
they are, whenever possible, consistent with Article XXIV of the GATT and Article 
V of the GATS. 
 
Go beyond WTO commitments 
•  In areas that are covered by the WTO, they build upon existing WTO obligations. 
They also explore commitments related to trade and investment in areas not 
covered, or only partly covered, by the WTO. By so doing, APEC economies are 




•  They deliver the maximum economic benefits to the parties by being 
comprehensive in scope, and providing for liberalisation in all sectors. They 
therefore eliminate barriers to trade and investment between the Parties, including 
tariffs and non-tariff measures, and barriers to trade in services. 
•  Phase-out periods for tariffs and quotas in sensitive sectors are kept to a 
minimum, and take into account the different levels of development among the 
parties. Thus they are seen as an opportunity to undertake liberalisation in all 
sectors as a first step towards multilateral liberalisation at a later stage. 
 
Transparency 
•  By making the texts of RTAs/FTAs, including any annexes or schedules, readily 
available, the Parties ensure that business is in the best possible position to understand and take advantage of liberalised trade conditions. Once they have 
been signed, agreements are made public, in English wherever possible, through 
official websites as well as through the APEC Secretarial website. 
•  Member economies notify and report their new and existing agreements in line 
with WTO obligations and procedures. 
 
Trade Facilitation 
•  Recognising that regulatory and administrative requirements and processes can 
constitute significant barriers to trade, they include practical measures and 
cooperative efforts to facilitate trade and reduce transaction costs for business 
consistent with relevant WTO provisions and APEC principles. 
 
Mechanisms for consultation and dispute settlement 
•  Recognising that disputes over implementation of RTAs/FTAs can be costly and 
can raise uncertainty for business, they include proper mechanisms to prevent 
and resolve disagreements in an expeditious manner, such as through 
consultation, mediation or arbitration, avoiding duplication with the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism where appropriate. 
 
Simple Rules of Origin that facilitate trade 
•  To avoid the possibility of high compliance costs for business, Rules of Origin 
(ROOS) are easy to understand and to comply with. Wherever possible, an 
economy’s ROOS are consistent across all of its FTAs and RTAs. 
•  They recognise the increasingly globalised nature of production and the 
achievements of APEC in promoting regional economic integration by adopting 
ROOS that maximise trade creation and minimise trade distortion. 
 
Co-operation 
•  They include commitments on economic and technical cooperation in the relevant 
areas reflected in Part II of the OAA by providing scope for the parties to 
exchange views and develop common understandings in which future interaction 




•  Reflecting the inter-dependent and mutually supportive linkages between the 
three pillars of sustainable development – economic development, social 
development and environmental protection – of which trade is an integral 
component, they reinforce the objectives of sustainable development. 
 
 Accession of Third Parties 
•  Consistent with APEC’s philosophy of open regionalism and as a way to 
contribute to the momentum for liberalisation throughout the APEC region, they 
are open to the possibility for accession of third parties on negotiated terms and 
conditions. 
 
Provision for periodic review 
•  They allow for periodic review to ensure full implementation of the terms of the 
agreement and to ensure the terms continue to provide the maximum possible 
economic benefit to the parties in the face of changing economic circumstances 
and trade and investment flows. Periodic review helps to maintain the momentum 
for domestic reform and further liberalisation by addressing areas that may not 
have been considered during the original negotiations, promoting deeper 
liberalisation and introducing more sophisticated mechanisms for cooperation as 
the economies of the Parties become more integrated. 
 